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ON THE EFFECTIVE date of the new divorce law,' September 1,
1967, there will be five new grounds for divorce in New York
and one for judicial separation. In addition, adultery, which is a
ground for either, will include homosexual as well as heterosexual
intercourse.
The new grounds for divorce are cruelty, abandonment of one's
spouse for two years, confinement to prison for three years, living
apart for two years following a judicial separation, and living apart
for two years following the execution of a written separation agree-
ment.
The new ground for judicial separation is confinement to prison
for three years. The former grounds remain. They are cruelty, an
abandonment of no specified duration, non-support and, of course,
adultery.
The grounds are a compromise between the traditional fault
theory of divorce and separation, and the contemporary, so-called
dead marriage theory. The former views divorce and separation as
radical remedies for a marital wrong committed by the defendant.
It derives from an attitude toward marriage which emphasizes the
social function performed by the family. In order that this function
be performed, it holds that persons do, in fact, marry for better or
for worse, and that, consequently, a husband and wife have a duty
to see their marriage through, whatever the difficulty. This view
would, therefore, permit dissolutions and separations only where one
of the spouses has committed a wrong which strikes at the foundation
of the marital relationship. Adultery, cruelty, abandonment, separation
of the spouses because of imprisonment for crime, and non-support
of the wife by the husband are examples of such a wrong.
* B.A. (1951), Spring Hill College; LL.B. (1954), LL.M. (1958), Georgetown
University; Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University.
'N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254, § 15.
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The dead marriage theory of divorce
.and separation assumes that marriage,
like other contracts, is primarily for the
-personal fulfillment and satisfaction of the
-spouses. It would, therefore, permit a
marriage to be dissolved or the spouses
to be separated whenever it clearly appears
that the marriage has failed this objective.
Under this theory, it makes no difference
where the fault, if any, lies. The only
material question is whether the spouses
are, in fact, hopelessly estranged. The
legislative problem is that of establishing
,objective criteria by which to judge wheth-
,er a marriage is, in fact, dead. The
new divorce law adopts living apart for
two years after either a judicial separation
,or separation agreement as the criterion.
Adultery and Homosexual Activity
Adultery, as usually understood, con-
-tinues to be a ground for either divorce
or separation under the new law. But
the law enlarges the concept to include
"deviate sexual intercourse, voluntarily
performed by the defendant, with a person
-other than the plaintiff." This is broad
.enough to include perverted acts between
a man and a woman. However, the im-
portance of the provision doesn't lie here.
Adultery, as previously understood, already
included such acts. The deviate inter-
course referred to is a homosexual act
voluntarily performed by a married man
or woman with another person. Although
the legislature presumably had the practic-
ing homosexual in mind when it wrote
this provision, one homosexual act is as
sufficient for divorce or separation as is
a single heterosexual adultery.
Homosexual activity is made a ground
for divorce and separation because such
unfaithfulness breaches the marital con-
tract in essentially the same way as a
heterosexual adultery. If one accepts the
latter as a ground, it is reasonable enough
to accept the former.
The new law does not permit dissolu-
tions and separations because of sexual
perversion as such, but only for acts of
perversion with another person. Hence,
habitual, solitary masturbation, transves-
tism, exhibitionism, voyeurism and the
like are not adultery because they involve
no physical contact with another person.
For the same reason beastiality is not a
ground. However, were the guilty spouse
to flaunt his perversion in front of the
other, he could well be guilty of mental
cruelty which is, of course, another
ground for divorce or separation.
Cruel and Inhuman Treatment
Cruelty, previously only a ground for
separation, is made a ground for divorce
by the new law. However, the concept
of cruelty appears to remain unchanged.
The provisions concerning cruelty found
in the old law have been consolidated,
reworded and enacted as a ground for
both separation and divorce. There is
now an express reference to mental cruelty
in the divorce and separation statutes,
but the courts have accepted this as a
form of cruel and inhuman treatment for
years.
The justification for matrimonial actions
based upon cruelty is the necessity of
removing the plaintiff from a situation
in which his physical or mental well-being
is endangered by the defendant's torments.
Hence, cruelty consists of malicious con-
duct which makes it "unsafe" for the
injured spouse to live with the guilty
party. Cohabitation is unsafe only when
the conduct of the guilty spouse poses a
danger to the plaintiff's physical health
or to his reason. Absent a threat to
the plaintiff's physical or mental health,
there is no ground for divorce or separa-
tion because the danger which would
justify a dissolution or separation is miss-
ing. Mental cruelty, then, is a malicious
course of conduct by one spouse which
causes the other psychic suffering which,
in turn, has impaired or which threatens
to impair either the physical or mental
well-being of the injured spouse.
The new law provides that a matri-
monial action may be based upon such
cruel and inhuman treatment as renders
it "unsafe or improper" for the plaintiff
to cohabit with the defendant. Where
one spouse is maliciously persecuting the
other by repeated humiliation and con-
tempt, continued cohabitation is, no doubt,
"improper" even though the plaintiff's
health and reason are not endangered.
Thus, it is thought by some that a divorce
or separation can be procured in such
a case on the ground of mental cruelty.
But the law speaks not only of conduct
which renders it improper for the parties
to cohabit; it also requires conduct which
"endangers the physical or mental well-
being of the plaintiff." Therefore, it seems
that in order to make out mental cruelty
it is still necessary to prove that the
defendant's conduct endangers the plain-
tiff's health, whether physical or mental.
Abandonment
The new law, just as the old, provides
that an abandonment of no specified
duration is a ground for judicial separa-
tion. The law concerning abandonment as
a basis for separation is, therefore, un-
changed. A divorce may be obtained for
the abandonment of the plaintiff by the
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defendant for a period of two or more
years. The use of the word abandonment
in the divorce statute indicates that the
cases concerning this as a ground for
separation are precedent in divorce actions.
based upon this ground.
Abandonment as a ground for separa-
tion is a voluntary cessation of cohabita-
tion by one spouse without the other's,
consent, without justification and with
the persistent and obstinate intention of
never resuming cohabitation.
An abandonment does not occur as,
soon as the spouses are separated; an
indeterminate period of time, which can
be as long as four years, must elapse
before a refusal to cohabit ripens into
abandonment. It is said that a refusal
to cohabit does not become abandonment
until the refusal is persisted in, obstinately-
The time at which an unjustified refusal
to cohabit becomes obstinate and, hence,
abandonment is dependent upon the guilty
party's apparent justification. Where it
is or should be clear to the guilty spouse
that he has no justification, the refusal
to cohabit becomes abandonment within
a short time. But even in this case the
deserter is given a month or two or more
to reconsider and return to his spouse
before he is guilty of abandoning the
spouse. Where the guilty party has argu-
able justification and believes in good
faith that he is justified, as where his
right to refuse cohabitation depends upon
an uncertain question of law, a refusal of
many years is not obstinate until persisted
in after a court has resolved the question.
In the first case, a separation can be
obtained against the guilty party within
a few months or a year after his initial
refusal to cohabit. To obtain a separa-
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tion the innocent spouse need not wait
two years. In the second case, it may be
impossible to procure a separation even
though the parties have lived apart for
three or four years.
When the legislature specified a time
period in the provision for divorce for
abandonment, it presumably wanted to
obviate the sometimes difficult problem
of determining when a refusal to cohabit
was obstinate. It was presumably in-
tended that a divorce could be obtained
for an unjustified desertion as soon as,
but not before, it continued for two years
without regard to whether the defendant's
refusal to cohabit is obstinate. If the
new law is construed so as to effectuate
this intent, abandonment, as a ground for
divorce, will be defined as a voluntary
cessation of cohabitation by one spouse
without the other's consent, without justi-
fication, and with the intention of never
resuming cohabitation, which is persisted
in for at least two years.
The Living Apart Grounds for Divorce
The new divorce law authorizes the
conversion into a divorce of either a
judicial separation or a written contract
of separation executed by the husband
and wife. While there are questions of
detail and technical requirements, the
intent of the law is clear. A divorce may
be obtained by either spouse when the
parties have lived separate and apart for
at least two consecutive years following
either a judicial separation or the execu-
tion of a written separation agreement,
provided that the one seeking the dissolu-
tion has in the interim complied with all
the terms and conditions of the separation
decree or agreement.
These two are the grounds which re-
fleet the dead marriage theory of divorce.
They were enacted in the belief that
there is no better evidence that a union
is unviable than the fact that the spouses
have led, for an extended time, independent
lives after marital difficulties which had
previously resulted in a judicial separation
or the execution of a separation agree-
ment.
While condonation is not a defense to
a divorce action based upon either of
these grounds, the plaintiff must show
affirmatively that the spouses have "lived
separate and apart." Presumably, this
means the husband and wife must dwell
apart in separate abodes without sexual
intercourse for at least two consecutive
years immediately preceding the divorce
action so as to unequivocally evidence the
death of the marriage. Where the spouses
have cohabited or had intercourse during
the two years preceding the divorce action,
it seems that they have not been apart
long enough to clearly establish their
irreconcilability at the time the divorce
is sought. Thus, when the parties, at-
tempting a reconciliation, resume cohabi-
tation after a judicial separation 'or
separation agreement, there can be no
dissolution until two years after the
attempt fails and the cohabitation ceases.
But two years after the cohabitation is
terminated, either party could procure a
dissolution, the cohabitation following the
separation decree or agreement notwith-
standing.
In order to convert a separation decree
or agreement into a divorce, the one
seeking the divorce must show that he
has complied with "all" the terms of the
decree or agreement up to the time of
the divorce proceeding. This means,
principally, that the husband can procure
a divorce only if he has faithfully made
the support payments required by the
separation decree or agreement. But a
breach of other terms, such as child
visitation provisions, could also prevent
either the husband or wife from obtaining
a divorce.
An action for divorce alleging one of
the living apart grounds cannot be initi-
ated until September 1, 1967. However,
living apart for two years after September
1, 1966 will suffice. But living apart prior
to September 1, 1966 is not to be counted
in computing the time the parties have
been apart. Apparently any separation
decree or agreement can be converted
into a divorce no matter when the decree
was granted or the agreement executed.
Thus, any separation decree or agreement
is a ground for divorce when the parties
have lived apart for two years after
September 1, 1966. Consequently, a
divorce could be granted on these grounds
as early as September 1, 1968, but not
before.
Defenses
Except for the present statutes of
limitations, it was intended that the new
law leave intact the defenses to divorce
and separation actions based upon an
heretofore existing ground, whether the
defenses were available by virtue of
statute or case law. Therefore, the
defenses of collusion, connivance, condo-
nation and recrimination are still available
to defeat either a divorce or separation
action based upon the defendant's adultery.
Furthermore, recrimination, by virtue of a
statute, and condonation, as a result of
case decisions, are defenses to separation
actions based upon the defendant's cruelty,
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abandonment or non-support. As regards
a separation action alleging the new
ground, confinement to prison, it is clear
that recrimination will, and that condo-
nation should, defeat the action.
On the other hand, it was intended
that there be no defenses to a divorce
action based upon one of the new grounds
other than those provided by the pro-
visions of the new law. But except for
a statute of limitations, the new law only
provides that a resumption of cohabita-
tion will bar a divorce action based upon
abandonment. Thus, except for condo-
nation of abandonment, it seems that con-
donation and recrimination will not defeat
a divorce action based upon cruelty,.
abandonment, confinement to prison or
one of the living apart grounds.
The abolition of defenses is a corollary
of the dead marriage theory of divorce.
It is, therefore, logical to provide for no
defense insofar as the living apart grounds
are concerned. It would be ridiculous to
deny a divorce because the parties had
"colluded" in or "connived" at the execu-
tion of a separation agreement. Since no
fault is involved in these grounds, con-
donation and recrimination likewise have
no part to play.
But the failure to provide for defenses
where the fault grounds of cruelty, aban-
donment and confinement to prison are
involved makes no sense either. Consider
some of the consequences.
Consider the case where at one time
the husband has been confined to prison
for three years. Upon his release he and
his wife resume cohabitation. Later she
becomes angry for a trivial reason such
as a slighting remark about her mother.
She leaves the husband and seeks a
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divorce on the ground of confinement to
prison. It seems she will get it unless
the statute of limitations bars the action.
In any event, the condonation of the
husband's fault will not defeat the action;
and she will obtain a divorce because of,
in effect, the husband's remark about his
mother-in-law.
The failure to provide for condonation
as a defense in the case above is even
worse than it at first seems. When she
leaves her husband, the wife might be as
satisfied with a judicial separation as a
dissolution of the marriage. But, if she is
to bring a matrimonial action, it must be
a divorce action because it seems that
the resumption of cohabitation will bar
a separation on the ground of confine-
ment to prison.
There is yet another anomaly. Where
the husband is guilty of adultery, condo-
nation of the offense will subsequently bar
a divorce on that ground. It is incon-
sistent to bar a divorce in the case of a
condoned adultery, but to permit one for
a condoned confinement, cruelty or aban-
donment.
The period of limitations on a divorce
or separation action brought because of
adultery is five years from the time the
offense was discovered by the plaintiff.
Divorce and separation actions brought
upon another ground must be commenced
within five years after the ground arose;
except that there is no period of limitation
on actions based upon abandonment or
one of the living apart grounds.
Jurisdiction of New York Courts in
Matrimonial Actions
The new law confers jurisdiction upon
the New York courts to entertain divorce
and separation actions only when at least
one of the spouses is domiciled in the
state at the time the action is initiated.
Consequently, all New York divorce and
separation decrees will be founded upon
the traditional jurisdictional basis of domi-
cile and there will be no question of
their validity. In the past, the courts
could assume jurisdiction when neither
party was a resident of the state if the
marriage had been contracted here or if
both spouses had resided here when the
adultery occurred. It is doubtful whether,
in the first case, there is sufficient contact
between the marriage and the state of
New York to justify an assertion of juris-
diction over the marriage by the courts
of this state. That doubt is obviated by
the new jurisdictional provisions.
Foreign Divorces
The new provision dealing with migra-
tory out-of-state divorces obtained by New
York citizens effects nlothing new. It
provides that in two cases the procurer
of a foreign divorce is presumed to have
been domiciled in New York at the time
he instituted the divorce action. This is,
first, when the procurer was domiciled
here within twelve months prior to the
commencement of the divorce action and
resumed his residence here within eighteen
months after departing from New York;
and, second, when he maintained a house
or apartment here from the time he left
New York until the time he returned
after procuring the divorce.
The constitutionality of the statute has
been doubted for several reasons. It has
been said it is unconstitutional because it
permits collateral attack on bilateral
foreign divorces protected from such at-
(Continued on page 89)
 
